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  1 
A SIMPLE CONCEPT IN A COMPLICATED 
WORLD: ACTUAL CAUSATION, MIXED-DRUG 
DEATHS AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S 
OPINION IN UNITED STATES v. BURRAGE 
Abstract: On August 6, 2012, in United States v. Burrage, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction of a defendant for the 
crime of distribution of drugs resulting in death where the defendant sold her-
oin that played a part in a mixed-drug overdose death. The court reasoned that 
the statute, which provides for a mandatory twenty-year prison sentence when 
a defendant sells illegal drugs and a death results, only requires that the de-
fendant’s drugs contribute to the death. This Comment argues that the contrib-
utory cause standard of actual causation endorsed by the Eighth Circuit is 
flawed and that, on review, the U.S. Supreme Court should hold that the crime 
of distribution resulting in death requires a showing that the defendant’s drugs 
are a but-for cause of the death. When the but-for test of actual causation fal-
ters in the context of a death with multiple sufficient causes, courts should ex-
plain to jurors how they may find actual cause in these instances without re-
sorting to the imperfect contributory cause standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal laws impose severe penalties upon drug dealers when they sell 
drugs and a death results.1 Although distributing heroin, even in small quan-
tities, is punishable by imprisonment for up to twenty years, when a death 
results, twenty years becomes the minimum sentence.2 Because fatal over-
doses often involve multiple substances, prosecuting the crime of distribu-
tion of drugs resulting in death may be fraught with complicated causation 
issues.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). The Con-
trolled Substances Act (“CSA”) criminalizes the manufacture and distribution of controlled substanc-
es. See id. The CSA provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . 
to . . . distribute a controlled substance” and provides enhanced penalties “if death . . . results from 
the use of such substance.” See id. 
 2 See id. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (outlining the penalties associated with various violations of the 
CSA). 
 3 See Brief for the United States at 28–29, Burrage v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. 
Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-7515), 2013 WL 5461835, at *28–29. According to the National Center for 
Injury Prevention and Control, forty-six percent of overdose deaths in 2010 involved more than 
one class of drugs. See id. 
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In 2012, in United States v. Burrage, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit upheld a distribution of drugs resulting in death conviction of 
a defendant whose drugs were a “contributing cause” that “played a part” in 
a death.4 In contrast with the Eighth Circuit’s use of the contributory cause 
standard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has previously 
rejected the standard as a confusing gloss on the statute’s requirement that a 
death “result from” a defendant’s drugs.5 Given the apparent split between 
the circuits, Burrage has garnered the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the case will be heard in the upcoming Term.6 
This Comment argues that a contributory cause standard is improper 
because it allows for conviction where a defendant’s drugs are not conclu-
sively shown to be an actual cause of the death.7 Part I of this Comment 
discusses the factual and procedural history of the Burrage case and its con-
text amongst other federal appeals court decisions.8 Part II examines “actual 
cause” and explores the difficulty of defining that concept using traditional 
methods in the context of a death resulting from mixed-drug intoxication.9 
Part II then discusses the divergent approaches of the Eighth and Seventh 
Circuits in defining actual cause for distribution of drugs resulting in 
death.10 Finally, Part III suggests that neither approach is correct and urges 
the Supreme Court to invalidate the contributory cause standard, order a 
new trial, and announce a more nuanced and comprehensive standard for 
actual causation, what this Comment terms “But-for Plus.”11 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See 687 F.3d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. Apr. 
29, 2013) (No. 12-7515). The victim in Burrage died from an overdose after using multiple drugs, 
including heroin purchased from the defendant. See id. 
 5 See United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 6 See Burrage v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2049, 2049 (2013); William Peacock, SCOTUS 
Grants Cert. in 8th Cir. Drug Overdose Case, FINDLAW (Apr. 30, 2013, 3:22PM), http://blogs.find
law.com/eighth_circuit/2013/04/scotus-grants-cert-in-8th-cir-drug-overdose-case.html, archived at  
http://perma.cc/PZ36-ZX2R (terming the circuit split a “minor implied disagreement”). The Court 
will consider whether a person can be convicted for distribution of heroin resulting in death when 
the jury instructions allow a conviction if the distributed heroin “contributed to” death by “mixed 
drug intoxication,” but was not the sole cause of death. See Peacock, supra; Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 1, Burrage, 133 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2012) (No. 12-7515), 2012 WL 7991899, 
at *1. The Court will also consider whether the crime of distribution of drugs resulting in death is 
a strict liability crime, without a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement. Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, supra, at 1. The Court declined to address a third issue concerning the admissibility 
of testimony that Burrage was a “known” drug dealer. See id. This Comment focuses solely on the 
contributing cause issue. See infra notes 7–95 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 72–95 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 12–33 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 34–57 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 72–95 and accompanying text. 
2014] Proving Actual Causation for Distribution of Drugs Resulting in Death 3 
I. UNITED STATES V. BURRAGE AND THE CIRCUIT DISAGREEMENT 
On April 14, 2010, Joshua Banka purchased one gram of heroin from 
Marcus Burrage.12 That night, Banka used the some of the heroin with sev-
eral other illegal drugs, and was found dead of an overdose the next morn-
ing.13 Federal prosecutors subsequently charged Burrage with distribution 
of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in death.14 By charging for 
distribution resulting in death, Burrage’s potential sentence increased from a 
range of zero to twenty years imprisonment to a mandatory minimum of 
twenty years imprisonment.15 
During Burrage’s trial, medical experts testified that Banka died from 
mixed-drug intoxication.16 Banka’s toxicology screen revealed the presence 
of multiple drugs, including morphine (a metabolite of heroin), oxycodone, 
alprazolam, clonazepam, and marijuana.17 Of all the drugs in Banka’s sys-
tem, morphine was the only one above the therapeutic range.18 Although a 
doctor stated that death without ingesting heroin was “very less likely,” nei-
ther she nor a toxicologist could rule out the possibility that Banka would 
have died even without the heroin.19 As a result, neither expert could say the 
heroin supplied by Burrage was more than a contributing cause to the 
death.20 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018. 
 13 See id. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); OFFICE 
OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DRUG PRIMER 1–2 (2013), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/Legal/Primers/Primer_Drug.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8HQ-F9U6. The CSA 
did not initially contain a sentencing enhancement for distribution resulting in death. See Pub. L. 
No. 91-513, §§ 401–403, 84 Stat. 1236, 1260–64 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)–
(b)). The enhancement appeared in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, enacted to provide a vehicle 
for more stringent enforcement of drug laws as part of the War on Drugs. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
§ 1002, 100 Stat. 3207-2 to -4 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)–(c)); Frontline, Thirty 
Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/drugs/cron, archived at http://perma.cc/YGC7-BC5X (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). The na-
tional outcry over the high-profile overdose death of young basketball star Len Bias, among other 
events, prompted Congress’s enactment of “extremely stiff penalties” for drug dealers, especially 
in the event of a drug-related death. See 132 CONG. REC. 27,161 (1986) (statement of Sen. Dennis 
DeConcini). Some have characterized the 1986 Act as hastily drafted and reactionary. See Brief of 
Families Against Mandatory Minimums as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Burrage, 
133 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. July 26, 2013) (No. 12-7515), 2013 WL 4737194, at *13. Despite numerous 
amendments to § 841, however, the distribution resulting in death enhancement remains undis-
turbed. See Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at 4 & n.2. 
 16 Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018–19. 
 17 Id. at 1018. 
 18 Id at 1018–19. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. Determining cause of death from a medical perspective when multiple drugs are 
present is often complicated, and the “problem is particularly encountered for opiate drugs with a 
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Burrage requested jury instructions requiring that the death had to be 
foreseeable and that, but-for the heroin, the death would not have oc-
curred.21 He argued that the government’s evidence could not conclusively 
show that Banka’s death resulted from the heroin.22 The trial judge rejected 
this argument, however, and instead gave instructions permitting conviction 
if the heroin was a “contributing cause” in the death.23 The jury entered a 
guilty verdict and Burrage was later sentenced to twenty years in prison.24 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld Burrage’s conviction.25 Burrage 
reaffirmed a prior Eighth Circuit decision holding that distribution resulting 
in death requires only that the defendant’s drugs be a “contributing cause” 
in the victim’s death.26 Moreover, the Burrage court held that the contribu-
tory cause standard would apply without regard for proximate cause or 
foreseeability because the statute imposes strict liability upon a defendant 
whenever a death results.27 
The contributing cause standard is not universally accepted.28 In 2009, 
in United States v. Hatfield, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
                                                                                                                           
wide range of therapeutic levels, such as morphine.” See Michael Panella, Problematic Legal 
Causations of Death: Interacting with the Medical Examiner, 44 TENN. B.J. 21, 21, 27 (2008). 
 21 See Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1020 & n.3. In his jury instructions, Burrage also proposed a defi-
nition of proximate cause that included a concept of but-for cause requiring the jury to find that 
the heroin “contribute[d] substantially to producing the death.” See id. 
 22 See id. at 1019. 
 23 See id. The district court instructed the jury, “[f]or you to find that a death resulted from the 
use of heroin, the Government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the heroin distributed 
by the defendant was a contributing cause of Joshua Banka’s death.” Id. The instruction defined 
contributing cause as “a factor that, although not the primary cause, played a part in the death.” Id. 
 24 See id. at 1018, 1020. 
 25 Id. at 1018. Burrage appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial. See id. He had moved 
for acquittal twice at trial and when he was convicted, moved for a new trial. See id. The district 
court denied all of the motions. See id. 
 26 See id. at 1020; United States v. Monnier, 412 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2005) (using contrib-
utory cause standard in distribution resulting in death case); cf. United States v. Washington, 596 
F.3d 926, 944 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding two counts of distribution of drugs resulting in death 
when medical testimony confirmed that each controlled substance ingested by the victim could 
have independently caused the victim’s death). 
 27 See Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018–19; see also United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 973 
(8th Cir. 2001) (holding that distribution resulting in death is a strict liability crime). This interpre-
tation has been followed by a substantial majority of federal appeals courts holding that distribu-
tion resulting in death does not require proof of proximate cause, foreseeability, or mens rea. See, 
e.g., United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1131 
(2012) (holding that § 841(b) does not require proximate cause or foreseeability); United States v. 
Houston, 406 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521, 
525 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating in dicta that § 841(b) is “[i]n effect, a strict liability statute”); United 
States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the statute does not require 
proximate cause). On petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, Burrage argued 
that distribution resulting in death requires proof of proximate cause, foreseeability and mens rea. 
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 1. 
 28 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 951. 
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cuit held that the standard is ambiguous and likely to confuse a jury.29 
There, the defendants were charged with conspiracy to burglarize pharma-
cies and to distribute controlled substances, the use of which resulted in 
four deaths.30 At trial, the jury received instructions similar to those given in 
Burrage and were told that the statute’s “results from” requirement was met 
so long as the drugs “at least . . . played a part” in the deaths.31 The defend-
ants were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.32 The Seventh Cir-
cuit later vacated the convictions, holding that the jury should have been 
instructed to use the “results from” language of the statute without embel-
lishment.33 
II. ACTUAL CAUSATION IN THEORY AND AS APPLIED TO DISTRIBUTION 
RESULTING IN DEATH 
Defendants in distribution resulting in death cases, like other criminal 
defendants, cannot be held responsible for a crime if their actions, however 
corrupt, are not an “actual cause” of the particular harm in question.34 Thus, 
where a death allegedly “results from” a defendant’s drugs, the government 
must prove a causal relationship between the drugs and the victim’s death in 
order to obtain a conviction.35 As important as this requirement is for attrib-
uting criminal culpability, actual causation remains an enigmatic concept 
that often confuses courts, juries and lawyers.36 Section A of this Part dis-
                                                                                                                           
 29 See id.; infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 947. 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. at 948–49. 
 34 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 184 (6th ed. 2012); CHARLES E. 
TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 122–24 (14th ed. 1978) (categorizing actual causation as the 
“minimal requirement” for criminal liability); see also United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 948 
(7th Cir. 2009) (stating that actual cause is the “minimum concept of cause”). Without the concept 
of actual cause, unlimited liability could result. See WILLIAM PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264 (5th ed. 1984); see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS ET AL., CRIMI-
NAL LAW 687 (2d ed. 1969) (“[I]t is neither necessary nor useful to exhaust the philosophical pos-
sibilities of actual causation.”). 
 35 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 948. Although federal appeals courts agree that distribution result-
ing in death does not require proximate cause, a minimal causal connection between the defend-
ant’s drugs and the victim’s death is required. See United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1254–55 
(11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1131 (2012) (“The statute requires a[n] [actual causation] 
connection . . . . It does not require that the defendant’s conduct proximately cause the death.”); 
United States v. Houston, 406 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[Actual causation] is required by 
the ‘results’ language, but proximate cause . . . is not a required element.”).  
 36 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 947 (“Causation is an important issue . . . [y]et it continues to 
confuse lawyers, in part because of a proliferation of unhelpful terminology (for which we judges 
must accept a good deal of the blame).”); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW 393 (2d. ed. 2003) (noting that causation in criminal law is difficult in only a minority of 
cases, but arises often enough to warrant considerable attention by courts). 
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cusses the failure of the traditional but-for test to determine actual cause in 
a multiple-drug overdose.37 Then, Section B discusses the divergent views 
of the Eighth and Seventh Circuits concerning the contributory cause stand-
ard as a test for actual cause in these circumstances.38 
A. Actual Causation in Theory: The Inadequacy of a But-for Test 
The but-for test is traditionally used to determine actual causation.39 
This approach asks whether a result would have occurred but-for a defend-
ant’s conduct.40 If the result would have occurred anyway, then the defend-
ant’s conduct is not an actual cause.41 In this way, the but-for test is a fairly 
accurate proxy for actual causation because it rules out insignificant actions 
that have no bearing on a result.42 
The but-for test fails, however, when multiple factors concurrently 
cause a result.43 Suppose A fatally shoots V in the head, while B simultane-
ously delivers a fatal gunshot to V’s heart.44 Both actors are equally respon-
sible for V’s death and the law should allow for each to be prosecuted.45 
Under a but-for analysis, however, V would have died from B’s shot to the 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See infra notes 39–57 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text. 
 39 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 (1985) (noting that actual cause, formulated in 
terms of the but-for approach, is the “simple, pervasive meaning of causation in the penal law”); 
DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 184 (discussing the but-for approach); PERKINS, supra note 34, at 
688–89 (discussing the but-for approach); TORCIA, supra note 34, at 122–23 (describing actual 
causation in terms of a but-for model). Burrage argued for the but-for approach at trial, on appeal, 
and on petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. See United States v. Burrage, 687 
F.3d 1015, 1020 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2013) 
(No. 12-7515); Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 33–36, Burrage v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2049 
(U.S. Jul. 19, 2013) (No. 12-7515), 2013 WL 3830502 at *33–36; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 6, at 1. Some courts have used the but-for approach in the context of distribution result-
ing in death. See Webb, 655 F3d. at 1255 (approving jury instructions defining actual causation 
under the but-for standard). 
 40 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 184. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. The but-for test serves an exclusionary function. See id. For example, suppose de-
fendant A rigs the car of victim, V, with a bomb. See id. Before V enters the car, he is shot dead by 
defendant B. See id. Because V would have died but-for A’s car bomb, A’s actions are not an actual 
cause of V’s death. See id. at 185. The but-for test thus excludes A’s actions from the ambit of 
actual causes of V’s death. See id.; see also Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntari-
ness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 1592 (2013) (discussing the ways in which the absence of 
but-for cause justifiably precludes criminal liability even where a crime’s actus reus is committed 
voluntarily). 
 43 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 187–88; LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 394–95 (discussing 
the inadequacy of a but-for test of actual causation where multiple sufficient causes exist). 
 44 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 184; LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 394–95. 
 45 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 184; LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 394–95; see also MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 (1985) (“All who have considered the issue agree that each of the as-
sailants should be liable . . . .”). 
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heart even without A’s shot to the head.46 Thus, A’s shot would not be an 
actual cause, and A could not be convicted for V’s death.47 This anomalous 
outcome reveals the inadequacy of the but-for approach.48 
Multiple-drug overdoses provide fertile ground for situations that ren-
der the but-for test deficient.49 Suppose a person dies after ingesting five 
drugs, V, W, X, Y and Z.50 Medical evidence later reveals that either a com-
bination of VWX or YZ was capable of producing death.51 Just as the shots 
fired by A and B in the prior example were both actual causes, so too are 
each of the two drug combinations.52 Importantly, if medical evidence re-
vealed that the drug V was not a necessary element to make VWX lethal, V 
would not be an actual cause.53 The but-for test, as these hypotheticals illus-
trate, is under-inclusive—it fails to account for all actual causes.54 
Although the but-for test fails in these hypotheticals, such circum-
stances are easily defined as a special set of exceptions.55 First, where two 
concurrent causes are each sufficient to produce a result, each is an actual 
cause of the result.56 Second, where one such sufficient cause itself involves 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 394–95. 
 47 See id. Conversely, B’s shot appears not to be an actual cause of the death either because V 
would have died but-for B’s shot. See id. 
 48 Id. For a discussion of alternative formulations of the but-for test to accommodate these 
anomalies, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 (suggesting a modification of the but-for test 
under which the inquiry is whether a result would have occurred when and as it did but-for a given 
action); DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 188 (same); LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 394–95 (suggesting 
the appropriate inquiry is whether an action is a substantial factor in bringing about a given result). 
 49 See Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at 28–29. But see Webb, 655 F.3d. at 1255 
(finding the but-for test sufficient in a distribution resulting in death case). 
 50 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 187–88 (discussing these deficiencies within the context 
of certain violent crimes). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. Actual cause would be determined by applying a but-for test within the framework 
of the concurrent sufficient cause scenario. See id. at 184; PERKINS, supra note 34, at 688–89; 
TORCIA, supra note 34, at 122–23. WX would still have been fatal regardless of V, so V is not an 
actual cause in the death because it is not required for one of the concurrent sufficient causes of 
the death. See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 184; PERKINS, supra note 34, at 688–89; TORCIA, 
supra note 34, at 122–23. See generally Eric A. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Loss of a Chance, 
91 IOWA L. REV. 59 (2005) (exploring actual cause and “multiple sufficient causal sets” in the 
context of lost-chance and accelerated-result scenarios). 
 54 See LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 394 (discussing actual causes not captured by the but-for 
test). The but-for test can also be over-inclusive if it is applied in the abstract. See Hatfield, 591 
F.3d at 948–49. For example, when a gunsmith manufactures a firearm, that action becomes a but-
for cause of any future gun-related death involving that particular firearm; the death would not 
have occurred but-for the gun’s creation. See id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 2 
(1985) (characterizing but-for causation as a “broad principle” needing limitation in certain appli-
cations). Typically, the concept of proximate cause is used to eliminate but-for causes that are not 
relevant for legal liability. See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 188–89. 
 55 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 186–88 (discussing “Special ‘Actual Cause’ Problems”). 
 56 See id. at 187–88 (discussing concurrent sufficient causes). 
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a combination of factors, a factor is an actual cause of the result if it is es-
sential to the combination.57 
B. Actual Causation as Applied: The Differing Approaches of the Eighth 
and Seventh Circuits 
Eschewing the traditional but-for test, for several years, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has utilized a contributory cause standard 
for distribution resulting in death.58 The court first adopted the standard in 
its 2005 decision United States v. Monnier.59 There, the defendant was con-
victed of distributing methamphetamine resulting in death after a jury found 
his drugs to be the proximate cause of the victim’s death.60 On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction, but emphasized that the jury’s finding 
of proximate cause was not required. 61 Nevertheless, the defendant was 
properly convicted, the court held, because “the jury found proximate cause 
beyond a reasonable doubt, which necessarily means that it found contribu-
tory cause.”62 
In Burrage, the Eighth Circuit hewed closely to Monnier and affirmed 
the lower court’s decision to instruct the jury using the contributory cause 
standard.63 The court clarified that a defendant may be convicted of distri-
bution resulting in death if the ingestion of the defendant’s drugs “play[ed] 
a part” in the victim’s multiple-drug-related death.64 Explicit but-for causa-
tion is not required.65 Thus, although neither medical expert could testify 
that Banka would not have died but-for using Burrage’s heroin, Burrage 
was convicted because the jury found that the heroin “played a part” in 
Banka’s death.66 
In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, sup-
plementing the “results from” language of the statute with the contributory 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See id. In this context, “essential to the combination” means but-for the presence of the 
factor, the combination would not be sufficient to cause the result. See id. 
 58 See Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1021; United States v. Monnier, 412 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 59 See Monnier, 412 F.3d at 862. 
 60 See id. at 860. 
 61 See id. at 862. 
 62 See id. The court defined “contributing cause” as “[a] factor that—though not the primary 
cause—plays a part in producing a result.” See id. 
 63 See Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1021 (citing Monnier, 412 F.3d at 862) (“[Section] 841(b)(1)’s 
‘results from’ requirement is met by a ‘contributing cause.’”); see also supra note 23 and accom-
panying text (discussing the district court’s jury instructions). 
 64 See Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1021. This contributory cause approach is alluring, especially for 
the prosecution, because it avoids the under-inclusiveness of the but-for test. See LAFAVE, supra 
note 36, at 464, 467. 
 65 See Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1021. 
 66 See id. 
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cause standard is forbidden.67 In its 2009 decision United States v. Hatfield, 
the court considered the Monnier opinion and held that the contributory 
cause standard risked obscuring the requirements of actual cause.68 Rather 
than aiding juries in parsing these problems, the Seventh Circuit held that 
phrases such as “contributory cause” and “played a part” were likely con-
fusing to a jury.69 The statute’s language alone, according to the court, was 
“a good deal clearer . . . and probably clear enough.”70 Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit takes the position that juries can navigate these complicated fact 
scenarios involving multiple causes when presented with the unadorned 
requirement that a death must result from the defendant’s drugs.71 
III. A SUPERIOR APPROACH: INSTRUCTING JURIES ON ACTUAL CAUSATION 
Burrage v. United States presents the U.S. Supreme Court with an op-
portunity to shed light on the frighteningly ambiguous “results from” lan-
guage in the distribution resulting in death statute.72 First, the Court should 
hold that the Eighth Circuit’s contributory cause standard is impermissibly 
expansive, as it allows a jury to convict a defendant absent a finding of ac-
tual causation.73 The Court should emphasize that actual causation, under 
the but-for test, is a minimum requirement for criminal liability.74 The Court 
should then announce a policy of explaining to the jury the exceptional fac-
tual circumstances where the but-for test fails and of describing how actual 
causation may nevertheless be found.75 This approach avoids resorting to 
the imperfect contributory cause standard to accommodate these exception-
al circumstances, while providing more comprehensive instruction to the 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 949. 
 68 See id. at 950. In its 2009 decision United States v. Hatfield, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit read the contributory cause standard articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit in its 2005 decision United States v. Monnier as trying, “not terribly success-
fully,” to explain that the statute did not require proximate cause. See id. 
 69 See id. at 949. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); United States 
v. Burrage, 687 F.3d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 2049 (U.S. Apr. 
29, 2013) (No. 12-7515). 
 73 See United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2009); TORCIA, supra note 34, at 
122; cf. Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018, 1020 (approving of the contributory cause standard and up-
holding Burrage’s conviction, even though the jury was only required to find that the heroin 
“played a part” in the death). 
 74 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 948 (stating that actual cause is the “minimum concept of cause”); 
TORCIA, supra note 34, at 122–23 (categorizing actual causation as the “minimal requirement” for 
criminal liability). 
 75 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 186–88 (discussing “Special ‘Actual Cause’ Problems”); 
see also supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (discussing special concurrent cause situations 
that may arise in a mixed drug overdose context). 
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jury than simply presenting the unadorned statutory language.76 In light of 
the severe sentences accompanying a conviction for distribution resulting in 
death, the Court should provide a pellucid standard of actual causation for 
juries to apply in these cases.77 
The Supreme Court should invalidate Burrage’s contributory cause 
standard because it misstates the level of causation required for liability for 
distribution resulting in death.78 Under this standard, a jury might wrongly 
convict a defendant of distribution resulting in death without finding the 
distributed drugs to be an actual cause of the death.79 Requiring that drugs 
“played a part” does not accurately convey the important contours of actual 
causation to the jury.80 Instructions that the heroin must have “played a 
part” in the death, without more, do not sufficiently guide the jury through 
the confusing causal morass of a mixed-drug death.81 Indeed, in Burrage, 
although prosecutors provided the jury with ample evidence that heroin 
“played a part” in Banka’s death, the testimony failed to conclusively estab-
lish that the heroin, alone or in combination with other substances, was suf-
ficient to bring about Banka’s death.82 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Cf. Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018–19, 1021 (applying the contributory cause standard); Hat-
field, 591 F.3d at 949 (applying the unadorned-statutory-language approach). 
 77 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 39, at 36 (arguing for a stricter causal standard 
than contributory cause in light of the severe sentences accompanying a violation of the statute); 
Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2009, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. 3 (Dec. 2011), http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P5M9-9YJS. Actual causation 
is highly important because distribution resulting in death has been characterized as a strict liabil-
ity offense. See United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250–55 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 1131 (2012) (collecting cases); see also Burrage v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2049, 2049 
(2013) (granting certiorari on the question of whether distribution resulting in death is a strict 
liability offense). Strict liability offenses may present “the most important causation field in crimi-
nal law” because, absent mens rea or proximate cause, actual causation is the sole connection 
between a defendant’s conduct and the crime with which he or she is charged. See Paul K. Ryu, 
Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773, 802 (1958). A just resolution of this issue is 
even more urgent due to the fact that drug overdose deaths in the United States steadily rise and, 
perhaps as a result, federal drug offenders are aggressively policed, prosecuted and sentenced. See 
Christopher M. Jones et al., Pharmaceutical Overdose Deaths, United States, 2010, 309 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 657, 657–59 (2013). Data shows overdose deaths have increased for eleven consecu-
tive years, with 38,329 people dying from a drug overdose in 2010. See id. Moreover, in 2009, 
over 25,000 defendants were convicted of drug offenses, with ninety-one percent of those defend-
ants receiving prison sentences. See Motivans, supra, at 13 & tbl. 11. 
 78 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 949; cf. Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018. 
 79 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 951 (noting that the contributory cause standard may confuse a 
jury and obscure the requirement of actual causation). 
 80 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 949. A reasonable jury could understand “played a part” and “con-
tributing factor” as permitting a conviction where the defendant’s drugs were ingested by the victim 
but had an insignificant or dubious effect on causing the death. See id. 
 81 See id.; Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 39, at 36. “Played a part” might be under-
stood as “was present among the drugs ingested,” or “played any role, however insignificant.” See 
Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 949. 
 82 See Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018–19, 1021. 
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Improperly or insufficiently explaining the distribution resulting in 
death statute’s ambiguous “results from” language risks a jury inadvertently 
including factors that are not actual causes.83 Regardless of whether the “re-
sults from” language is supplemented by the contributory cause standard or 
left unadorned, both approaches risk a jury interpreting “results from” as 
not requiring actual causation.84 Especially without proper judicial guid-
ance, a jury could readily interpret “results from” as allowing for conviction 
absent actual causation.85 In this way, although presenting the jury with the 
plain statutory language does not actively lead them astray, the Hatfield 
court’s less-is-better approach still leaves open the possibility that the jury 
will misinterpret the statute’s causal requirement.86 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Burrage v. United States should not 
simply invalidate the contributory cause standard but should also guide 
lower courts in instructing juries on the proper standard of actual causation 
for distribution resulting in death.87 Supplementing the but-for test with ex-
plicit jury instructions would fully capture the universe of actual causes and 
obviate the problem in Burrage.88 To convict a defendant, juries should be 
instructed that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s 
drugs were an actual cause of the victim’s death.89 Actual cause should be 
defined by the but-for test, and the jury should be told under what circum-
stances they could find actual cause in complicated situations.90 In the event 
the but-for test is inadequate, juries should be instructed that actual cause 
may be found if a defendant’s drugs were either sufficient to have caused 
the death independent of any other substance, or were an essential element 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); Petitioner’s 
Opening Brief, supra note 39, at 36. The Burrage court approved of an improper explanation of 
“results from” to the jury: the contributory cause approach. See Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018–19, 
1021. Conversely, the Hatfield court’s unadorned statutory language approach insufficiently ex-
plains the meaning of “results from” to a jury. See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 949, 951. Both approaches 
are risky and improvident. Cf. Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018–19, 1021; Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 949. 
 84 See Burrage, 687 F.3d at 1018–19, 1021; Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 949, 951. 
 85 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 39, at 36; cf. Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 949–950 
(holding that the statutory language “results from” should not be explained to the jury because 
[e]laborating on a term often makes it less rather than more clear[]”). 
 86 See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 949. 
 87 See id. at 949, 951. The Hatfield court correctly held that the contributory cause language 
was likely to confuse a jury, but the opinion offered no solution to explaining complicated actual 
causation issues to juries in distribution resulting in death cases. See id. 
 88 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 185–88. This standard will be referred to as the “But-for 
Plus” approach.” See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed stand-
ard). 
 89 See LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 392 (“Causal connection requires something more than mere 
coincidence as to time and place.”). 
 90 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 186–88. 
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in a combination of drugs sufficient to cause the death.91 If either prong is 
met, defendant’s drugs are an actual cause even if another drug is inde-
pendently sufficient to have caused the death or a combination of drugs not 
including the defendant’s could have produced the death.92 
The Supreme Court should adopt this proposed “But-for Plus” ap-
proach because it accomplishes two important goals.93 First, the standard 
eliminates the contributory cause approach and thereby mitigates the risk of 
imprisoning a defendant for a minimum of twenty years where the defend-
ant’s drugs are not an actual cause of death.94 Second, the standard’s “plus” 
aspect is nimble enough to allow for effective prosecution of defendants 
where a death results from a mixed-drug overdose despite the difficulties of 
conclusively proving cause of death in these cases.95 
CONCLUSION 
Actual cause is a touchstone of criminal liability. The contributory 
cause standard that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit en-
dorsed in United States v. Burrage is too expansive because it permits juries 
to find criminal liability where the defendant’s drugs are not an actual cause 
of the victim’s death. The U.S. Supreme Court should reject the standard, 
vacate Burrage’s conviction and remand the case for a new trial. The better 
approach is to explicitly instruct the jury that they must find actual causa-
tion. The proposed “But-for Plus” standard should take as a starting point 
the traditional but-for test and supplement it to account for the extraordinary 
situations. Juries should be told that, even if a defendant’s drugs are not a 
but-for cause of the death, they are an actual cause if they are capable of 
causing death independently or are an essential element in a combination of 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See id. at 187–88; Johnson, supra note 53, at 92–95; see also Brief for the United States, 
supra note 3, at 24–25 & n.10 (discussing problems in establishing actual causation where multi-
ple factors are essential to a combination producing a result); supra notes 55–57 and accompany-
ing text (discussing these special concurrent cause situations). 
 92 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, at 184. 
 93 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 39, at 36; Brief for the United States, supra note 
3, at 24. A “But-for Plus” approach would satisfy defendant’s concern for a stricter causal stand-
ard. See Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 39, at 36. Simultaneously, this approach would 
accommodate the concerns of prosecutors who worry that defendants might unjustifiably avoid 
liability if the but-for test mistakenly fails to account for a defendant’s drugs as a cause. See Brief 
for the United States, supra note 3, at 24. 
 94 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 39, at 36 (arguing for a stricter causal standard 
in light of the severe penalties imposed for distribution resulting in death); Brief of Families 
Against Mandatory Minimums as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 15, at 16–17 
(arguing that proof of actual causation, in terms of a but-for cause model, is required under the 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
 95 See Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at 24 (expressing concern that an inflexible 
standard would “unduly limit criminal responsibility”). Explicitly defining the standard will also 
guide prosecutors in establishing relevant medical testimony at trial. See id. 
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drugs causing the death. This standard accommodates the difficult causation 
issues present in overdose deaths from multiple substances. Moreover, it 
provides sufficient protection for defendants while maintaining the govern-
ment’s ability to successfully prosecute offenders. 
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